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The Twentieth century witnessed the raise of several academic disciplines targeting science as a 
research object. History of science and philosophy of science were the first to get institutionalized in 
the university system, with the birth of the journal Isis by George Sarton in 1912 and the diffusion of 
Neo-positivist philosophy of science in U.S. universities by emigrated members of the Vienna Circle. 
Sociology of science soon followed, with the establishment of the institutional sociology of science 
school lead by Robert Merton in the Fifties. The publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by 
Thomas Kuhn in 1962 set a landmark in the history of the study of science, fueling the raise of new 
approaches in all the three mentioned disciplines. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
advanced by Edinburgh School and the emergence of the galaxy of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) would not have been possible without Kuhn’s work. The Sixties saw also the birth of the 
quantitative study of science, with the creation of the Science Citation Index by Eugene Garfield in 
1964. From the Eighties onward, the academic research targeting science has flourished enormously, 
addressing its research object from a wide range of methods and disciplinary perspectives (from 
cultural anthropology to economics, from philosophy to bibliometrics). Even if it these different 
studies of science have not coalesced into a unified and coherent picture of science, still it is right to 
say that today we know more and better how scientific inquiry works, at different levels and in different 
contexts. 
The second half of the century was marked not only by the flourishing of academic meta-
discourses on science, but also by the increasing interaction of science and society at large. The 
Manhattan project was the first occurrence of so-called “Big Science”, i.e. a huge techno-scientific 
project involving thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians, and funded by massive amount 
of public money. Science, the Endless frontier, the report delivered by Vannevar Bush to President 
Roosevelt in 1945, marked the dawn of science policy as a strategic issue in the United States. National 
Science Foundation (NSF) was soon created and categories like “basic” and “applied” research started 
rapidly to shape policy discussion about the organization and the funding of scientific research1. The 
main tenet of Fifties and Sixties science policy was the clear separation between scientific community 
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on one side, and politics and society on the other.2 Scientific community was conceived as an 
independent and self-managing community of experts, with the role of the government limited to 
inject public money into science, to which the managing of such money was entirely left. The 
economic crisis of middle-Seventies, as well as an increasing public awareness of the societal impact 
of science and technology, dramatically undermined the idea of a strict separation of science and 
society. The raise of New Public Management in the Eighties affected science policy, entering currency 
to the idea that the scientific community had to be accountable for the use it makes of public money. 
UK was the laboratory of new practices of research performance assessments, conducted in the name 
of the social accountability of the research and university system. In subsequent years, all major 
European countries began to establish their own agencies devoted to research quality assessment. 
Some of them were used to implement performance-based research funding systems the Italian 
ANVUR being one of the last to become operative (Hicks 2012). Nonetheless, even this most recent 
governance is getting scrutinized and debated by scholars all over the World. Thus, the social 
organization of science is unlikely to stop morphing over time. 
In sum, during the Twentieth century science become at the same time the object of a variety 
of meta-disciplines and a social activity meant to be steered by appropriate policies, also in the name of 
social accountability. Broadly speaking, the past century delivered to us two major perspectives on 
science, the former more descriptive and academic-based, the latter more prescriptive and 
government-based.  
Can these two frameworks interact, or do they speak from incommensurable points of view? 
Can theoretical and empirical investigations of science influence the design of appropriate science 
policy? To frame the question in a philosophical fashion: can the descriptive research on science affect 
the normative business of designing its organization? In order to frame this concern, in our call for 
papers we borrowed the following Marxian-flavored slogan from Philip Kitcher (1990: 22): “How do 
we best design social institutions for the advancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored the 
social structure of science. The point, however, is to change it”. 
The contributions collected in this Special Issue of Roars Transactions represent different fruitful ways 
of addressing these issues. Drawing from several of the above mentioned meta-disciplines (including 
philosophy of science, Science and Technology Studies and qualitative sociology), they display in 
different ways how to bridge academic-based reflections on science with political concerns about, 
amongst others, responsible innovation (Fuller, MacFarlane), grant allocation (Avin), 
interdisciplinarity (Gillett), and scientific careers (Eigi et al.). Globally, they provide a useful 
kaleidoscope of the variety of meanings under which “social epistemology” may be considered. 
We are particularly pride of hosting the letters of two founding fathers of social epistemology: 
Steve Fuller and Philip Kitcher. They both wrote crucial contributions that paved the way to research 
at the intersection of philosophy, STS and science policy. Fuller’s book Social Epistemology (1988) 
conceived social epistemology as the study of what kinds of knowledge are desirable and how such 
knowledge(s) can best be produced, assessed, and circulated. Fuller’s research programme is 
entrenched in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and STS, whereas Philip Kitcher’s variant of social 
epistemology is more connected to traditional epistemology. One of its greater merit has been to 
reintroduce the concern (originally investigated by American philosopher Charles Pierce, see Peirce 
1879) over how the “division of cognitive labor” in science should be arranged in order to maximize 
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epistemic progress (Kitcher 1990), thereby igniting a stream of research (sometimes labelled as 
“economic epistemology”), where mathematical and computer tools are used to model the behavior 
of agents in epistemic communities.  
In his brief letter, Kitcher ascertains that traditional epistemology has often maldeveloped 
Descartes’ legacy, and blames it for having insisted on overly scholarly debates of little import, 
threatening to turn epistemology into a new Aristotelianism. In contrast, he praises those who 
inherited and brought forward Descartes’ thrive for finding reliable knowledge, and who looked for 
that across scientific disciplines. Yet, given that science is a collective rather than an individualistic 
endeavor, Kitcher claims that «the chief epistemological problem of our day is to understand how to 
improve the knowledge-seeking endeavors of communities of investigators» (Kitcher, this issue). And 
he warmly welcomes the fact that this inquiry is being undertaken. 
Steve Fuller’s letter provides an excellent example of how philosophical reflection may affect 
the design of science policy principles, in this case the cluster of policies around the notion of 
“Responsible Innovation”. Responsible Innovation is one of the hottest themes in contemporary 
science policy and it is especially central in European science policy (see the RRI framework promoted 
by European Commission3). In Fuller’s essay, we can see how philosophy is used with a double-fold 
aim. On one hand, it serves as a critical tool to unveil general but tacit assumptions that inform present 
policies. On the other hand, it is used as a positive source of alternative principles that can produce 
very different policies. In particular, Fuller opposed to the current notion of “Anticipatory 
Governance” (i.e. the idea that societal actors and stakeholder should be involved in the whole 
research and innovation process, see Guston 2014), the radical idea of “precipitatory governance”. 
Precipitatory governance «operates on the assumption that some harm will be done, no matter what 
course of action is taken, and the task is to derive the most good from it» (Fuller, this issue). In this new 
framework, innovation becomes to a certain extent an end in itself. Even worst-case scenarios may 
become acceptable, in so far as they foster the innovation process in a way unreachable in normal 
conditions. Even if Fuller’s proposal may be seen as provocative and the idea that innovation is 
desirable per se may be questioned, his essay provides a precious example of how philosophical 
reflection can unveil and criticize assumptions that remain often tacit and unquestioned within science 
policy debates. 
The next two contributions may be described as contemporary research conducted, 
respectively, within Fuller’s and Kitcher’s research programmes in social epistemology.  
The paper by James M. MacFarlane bridges the gap between theoretical reflection and political action 
by advancing a theoretically-informed call for the establishment of a STS profession outside the 
academia. MacFarlane argues that STS practitioners would benefit from translating into a profession 
a role they already play in new technology assessments projects (such as Anticipatory Governance 
projects in UK) where they act as mediators between new technologies and the public. His proposal 
is to create a new sector of Science-Public-Relations professionals, where the cognitive-base and 
normative horizons of STS could find useful, extra-academic applications. According to MacFarlane, 
this would provide at the same time enhanced autonomy to STS practitioners and new directions for 
future STS research. It is interesting to point out that MacFarlane’s professional project echoes similar 
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attempts, made by social and human scientists around the world, to build extra-academic professions 
out of their fields4.  
In his essay, Shahar Avin exhaustively discusses the rationale for implementing a lottery system 
for the selection and funding of research projects. Moreover, he also lays out the foundation of a 
viable lottery system, specifying its constraints and general limitations. While the idea to introduce 
randomness into funding allocation may prima facie sound irrational, a thorough examination reveals 
that allocation based on peer review bears many elements of randomness and uncertainty too, as well 
as requiring much time (both for writing and for reviewing) and actual money (for administrative 
costs). In turn, lotteries employed in other contexts have been argued to increase both efficiency and 
fairness. In the context of grant allocation, introducing lotteries may (among other things) avoid 
harmful biases that often prevent unorthodox ideas from winning grants. It should be noticed that 
Avin is not arguing for a pure lottery system, but rather for a hybrid one that he dubs “triage”. In a 
triage allocation system, shorter projects are to be written and reviewed (allowing to save time), and 
placed in three groups, according to their estimated merit. Projects of higher and lower merit must 
then be respectively financed and discarded, whereas lottery is used to adjudicate between middle-
merit projects. 
The paper by Alexander J. Gillett shows how insights drawn from theoretical biology and 
behavioral science (notably the notion of “virtual collaboration” originally introduced by Michael 
Tomasello) may be useful not only to unveil the inter-generational structure of science, but also to 
optimize epistemic progress of science. Research in these fields points out that innovation occur often 
as the result of the re-combination of culturally accumulated knowledge across generations, reducing 
the role traditionally attributed to “geniuses” in the progress of science. In the light of these results, 
Gillett argues that interdisciplinary environments should be fostered both in science practice and 
scientific training, since they are the suitable conditions for innovative re-combination processes to 
happen.   
The final contribution is authored by an Estonian team of philosophers of science. Their 
research exemplifies what may be dubbed “micro-social epistemology”. Using a focus groups 
interviews methodology, they studied how the “production of the producers of knowledge” – i.e. the 
training of PhD students and early career researches in Estonian – can be ameliorated. Their main 
result is that wider support networks of peers and colleagues may compensate for shortcomings of 
official supervision. Once again, we can see how versatile the notion of social epistemology is: it can 
range from very general, philosophical contributions to carefully detailed case-studies. 
 Overall, this collection of papers represents an attempt to bring descriptive consideration 
concerning the social organization of science onto practical and prescriptive grounds. Aside from 
gathering the valuable contributions of each single paper, we thus deem that this special issue has the 
further merit to show that scholars in philosophy and in STS more in general need not confine 
themselves to the observation of how the social endeavor we call science actually works, but can (and 
perhaps should) provide their informed contribution for making it better. 
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